The question in my head is namely what exactly is free will. When talking about theodicy, I mentioned free will as being the ability to either perform morally bad and good actions, as opposed to only having the ability to perform morally good actions. What is then the distinction between the former and latter? Namely it is power or ability. It is our ability to distinguish between and perform good and bad actions that give rise to us being able to make a choice between the multiple options available to us. It also seems to me that these choices don't necessarily have to be a question of ethics (like choosing between morally good and bad actions), but could be choices concerning more general benefit or preference.
Why then is free will traditionally only applied to humans and not other animals? Many animals have the ability to make choices between multiple different options, they can have a preference for certain items and can make choices between options with different costs and benefits. So why then aren't animals considered to have free will as well?
I have heard the claim that animals act off of instinct and because this instinct is pre-programmed into them they essentially have no choice in the way they behave. What they are essentially arguing is the view that animals are deterministic creatures, who's "fates" and "choices" are already made for them based on their genetics and environment. This leads to the common argument against the naturalistic approach that understands our universe as completely material. If we and our actions are all just complex combinations of chemical processes we can't have a choice. The future is already pre-determined and we are unable to alter the inevitable future.
I used to hold this view as well and used to use it as an argument for Judaism and against naturalism. The question now becomes, why is this a successful argument? The problem is this isn't a very good argument at all. It only seems like a decent argument because we have a knee-jerk reaction to the notion that this world is deterministic, but just because we want something to be true doesn't make it so.
In order to resolve our dilemma it may be best to look inward and figure out why such a world would bother us so much. From what I can tell, it bothers us because it would mean that we wouldn't have any free will either. Just like animals we would be ruled by our instincts and as such have no free will as we previously defined it. Why is that a problem? It is argued that if this was the case then no one will be responsible for their actions and our actions would be meaningless. This seems to be the crux of the issue.
First off, I don't believe an animals life is meaningless simply because it is ruled by its own instincts. In addition, I wouldn't find a person who can only act on their own instincts as meaningless either (young children might be a good example or people with certain mental disabilities, if not all humans). What is meaningful and not is a very complicated question, but I am in no way convinced that simply living off of your own instincts deprives ones life of meaning. (Perhaps I will elaborate on the nature of meaning in a future post).
Secondly, being ruled by ones instincts isn't the defining factor in determining responsibility. I am sure you have heard of court cases in which people who have committed crimes claim not to have responsibility due to their upbringing or their genetic dispositions. Now while I fully recognize these factors and that they do indeed play a role in how a person acts, I would not pardon a person of their responsibility simply because they have an instinctual disposition to act in a certain way. That in of itself doesn't make it acceptable to act in that way. The reason is because when we have the power to make a choice between multiple options, that power gives us the responsibility to make sensible and moral choices. We are responsible for our actions because we, as humans, have the foresight to perceive how our actions will affect others, we can evaluate our actions in light of what other people feel about those actions and their consequences, and when we are asked for our reasons for acting in a certain way we can respond to them and explain our reasons. We have these abilities and powers and as a result we have responsibility regardless of what our natural tendencies incline us towards.
In this light we will be able to see why we are different than animals in regards to our notions of free will. Free will isn't just the ability to make choices, but also the ability to foresee the consequences of our actions, evaluate those consequences, and our ability to explain and defend our reasons for the choices we make to others. Since animals don't have these abilities, they are not responsible for their actions and thus don't have free will in the sense that we understand it.
This also helps resolve the tension between free will and naturalism/determinism. Since we have the abilities I mentioned above it doesn't matter if these abilities were granted to us by Hashem through a natural order of events, we are all responsible for actions and thus are all free regardless.
Without some supernatural component to our psyches, it seems very unlikely that we have free will. Every action in the universe is the result of some cause or causes, and there is no reason to think that our minds are any different.
ReplyDelete> It is argued that if this was the case then no one will be responsible for their actions and our actions would be meaningless. This seems to be the crux of the issue.
Which is still an appeal to consequences.
> I would not pardon a person of their responsibility simply because they have an instinctual disposition to act in a certain way. That in of itself doesn't make it acceptable to act in that way.
Which brings up the question, what is the purpose of the justice system? If the purpose of the justice system is to punish people (which seems to be the common assumption), then it is unfair to punish someone for something that is beyond his control. On the other hand, if the purpose of the justice system is to protect society from dangerous people, then responsibility is far less important than is the likelihood of repeat offenses. We lock up thieves and murderers, then, not to punish them but to protect everyone else from them.
There is also the possibility that, while we are all merely reacting to predispositions, conditioning, and stimuli, the existence of punishments is one of the factors that influences our behaviors.
> when we are asked for our reasons for acting in a certain way we can respond to them and explain our reasons
We are very good at explaining why we did something, but our explanations often have little to do with the actual reasons for our actions. People are less rational creatures than they are rationalizing ones.
G3,
ReplyDeleteI agree with most of what you just said (maybe all of it) but I would like to challenge you on your description of free will.
"Without some supernatural component to our psyches, it seems very unlikely that we have free will. Every action in the universe is the result of some cause or causes, and there is no reason to think that our minds are any different."
A few points:
1. I don't see having free will as being something in our minds that is independent of some cause or causes. I think defining free will as the ability to do something independent of any cause or causes is nonsensical and pointless. How is such an ability even useful to us?
2. Attributing free will to some supernatural power still doesn't resolve the issue. If it is impossible to have free will, it wouldn't matter if Hashem commanded us to be free, it would still be impossible.
3. Free will to me has nothing to do with being able to act without having a cause attributed to the act. I define it as the ability to predict the results of certain actions or events, evaluate the options and consequences of those options and the ability to reason through a certain choice and to explain this reasoning at least to oneself. Since all these things are indeed part of being human we have free will. These attributes makes us responsible for the actions we take.
Again, I don't see the value in any definition of free will that includes doing nonesensical things, like acting without causes. Wouldn't such an act free us of responsibility even more than my definition of free will?
> How is such an ability even useful to us?
ReplyDeleteIt’s not, except insofar as it allows us to assign responsibility to ourselves and others for actions.
> Attributing free will to some supernatural power still doesn't resolve the issue. If it is impossible to have free will, it wouldn't matter if Hashem commanded us to be free, it would still be impossible.
It resolves the issue like this:
P1) All actions in the universe are the result of prior causes.
P2) Our minds are emergent properties of our brains.
P2a) As such, our minds are part of the universe.
C1) Actions of our minds (decisions) are the result of prior causes.
P3) But we must have free will!
C2) Therefore P2 is wrong.
P4) Our minds are emergent properties of our brains AND our souls.
P5) Our souls are supernatural and not governed by the laws of universe.
P6) Therefore actions of our minds (decisions) are the result of prior causes and the uncaused actions of our soul.
C3) We have free will!
> I define it as the ability to predict the results of certain actions or events, evaluate the options and consequences of those options and the ability to reason through a certain choice and to explain this reasoning at least to oneself.
Being able to explain after the fact why one chose something, or even to predict explanations, is not the same as having the ability to choose.
> Again, I don't see the value in any definition of free will that includes doing nonesensical things, like acting without causes.
It’s not acting without cause perhaps so much as acting without compulsion. The prior causes of a physical universe compel certain outcomes. Dropping a stone off a cliff will always result in it falling. Similarly, given a set of prior causes and current circumstances a person will always react in the same way. Acting without reference to prior cuases removes the compulsion and allows for the assigning of responsibility.
> Wouldn't such an act free us of responsibility even more than my definition of free will?
How so? If your choices are merely the mechanistic workings of the natural world, then you cannot be held responsible for your actions any more than a boulder rolling down a hill can be held responsible for the path it takes. On the other hand, if you can willfully choose your path, if the boulder was aware and free to choose which way it went independent of friction and gravity, then the responsibility for the path taken lies with the one who chose it.
G3,
ReplyDeletebtw I just want to mention that I am enjoying this conversation very much.
Let me ask you this. If a person A has an option to perform an action X which is avoidable, then is A who performs X responsible for the consequences of that action?
I would conclude he is.
It seems to me that you are saying that since this universe is deterministic then nothing is avoidable and nothing is inevitable. Therefore no one is responsible for their actions and Free will is only an illusion. (correct me if this is not what you are saying).
> It seems to me that you are saying that since this universe is deterministic then nothing is avoidable… and Free will is only an illusion.
ReplyDeleteYup.
So do you now suppose that only some sort of spiritual or quantum indeterminacy is required to allow for free will? In other words in what way does adding indeterminacy into the equation at all improve one's ability to choose?
ReplyDeleteYou say that "Acting without reference to prior causes removes the compulsion and allows for the assigning of responsibility." How can anyone act without reference to prior causes? Can you choose something without a reason for the choice? Even including a soul from the supernatural realm doesn't remove the reason a person makes a choice.
You can define free will in such a way in which it is in contradiction with determinism, but such an understanding of free will doesn't add any benefit to understanding responsibility.
It is also not clear what is the compulsion that drives us to act. Is it not our own wants and desires, our own evaluation of the options before us that drives us to choose one option over another?
Why then are we not responsible for actions if the compulsion to perform those actions are our own wants, desires, evaluation of the options, considerations of the future consequences? Even if you could have all the knowledge of exactly all the processes at work in our universe and all the states in which every atom and particle are in in the universe, and as a result could predict exactly what actions I will take in the next state, I will still be responsible of the actions I take regardless. Not being able to make a correct prediction adds nothing to the notion of whether I am responsible or not.
> So do you now suppose that only some sort of spiritual or quantum indeterminacy is required to allow for free will?
ReplyDeleteNot indeterminacy. That just means that we can’t know about it. What’s needed is a magical soul that allows you to make choices based only on universal moral considerations rather than choices determined by the physical universe. That’s the only way that one can be held morally accountable for making a choice in violation of a moral rule.
> Even including a soul from the supernatural realm doesn't remove the reason a person makes a choice.
It’s supposed to free you from everything that determines your choices. So, your reason for stealing $100 might be that you want the money. Given only the physical universe, your act of theft is the result of your genetic makeup, your life experiences, and whatever is happening at the moment. The addition of the soul diminishes the influence of those factors and allows you to be held responsible for choosing to take the money. The soul’s decision is based not on genetics and conditioning, but on the angel on your right shoulder telling you that stealing is wrong, the devil on your left shoulder telling you about all the wonderful things you could buy, and you freely (uninfluenced by your predispositions, experiences, current level of wealth/poverty or the likelihood of getting caught) choosing between them.
> It is also not clear what is the compulsion that drives us to act. Is it not our own wants and desires, our own evaluation of the options before us that drives us to choose one option over another?
Responsibility for our actions implies that given the exact same set of circumstances, we could have done something different. Certainly, our wants, desires, etc. are part of what determines our choice, just as the protrusions on a boulder influence the path it takes as it rolls down a hill. Yet we are no more responsible (i.e., the cause of) for our desires than the boulder is responsible for its protrusions.
> Why then are we not responsible for actions if the compulsion to perform those actions are our own wants, desires, evaluation of the options, considerations of the future consequences?
Because we are not responsible for our “wants, desires, evaluation of the options, considerations of the future consequences.” As a philosopher whose name I forget said, “We can will what we choose but we cannot will what we will.”
> Even if you could have all the knowledge of exactly all the processes at work in our universe and all the states in which every atom and particle are in in the universe, and as a result could predict exactly what actions I will take in the next state, I will still be responsible of the actions I take regardless. Not being able to make a correct prediction adds nothing to the notion of whether I am responsible or not.
Absolutely. Whether WE can predict your action is irrelevant. What is relevant is whether it is predictable. If your actions can (theoretically) be predicted with certainty, if they are wholly dependent on the mechanistic progression of cause-and-effect and governed by natural law, then you no more choose what you will do than the boulder chooses which path to take down the hill.
"Not indeterminacy. That just means that we can’t know about it. What’s needed is a magical soul that allows you to make choices based only on universal moral considerations rather than choices determined by the physical universe. That’s the only way that one can be held morally accountable for making a choice in violation of a moral rule."
ReplyDeleteBut then you must assume that universal moral considerations indeed exist. Maybe I will make a post on that in the future as well, but if universal moral considerations don't exist, which I am inclined to suppose, then the addition of a spiritual component wouldn't add anything beneficial to the equation.
"It’s supposed to free you from everything that determines your choices. So, your reason for stealing $100 might be that you want the money. Given only the physical universe, your act of theft is the result of your genetic makeup, your life experiences, and whatever is happening at the moment. The addition of the soul diminishes the influence of those factors and allows you to be held responsible for choosing to take the money. The soul’s decision is based not on genetics and conditioning, but on the angel on your right shoulder telling you that stealing is wrong, the devil on your left shoulder telling you about all the wonderful things you could buy, and you freely (uninfluenced by your predispositions, experiences, current level of wealth/poverty or the likelihood of getting caught) choosing between them."
But we do take those considerations that the two "angels" whisper into our ears into account. That is part of the evaluation of the options. We do consider the benefits and the costs of our actions. In making our choice we take all of these factors into account. It seems superfluous to assume that the purpose of the soul is to present these options to us. It also doesn't explain why simply having a soul gives us responsibility for our actions, when not having it deprives us of this responsibility.
"Responsibility for our actions implies that given the exact same set of circumstances, we could have done something different."
Here is my biggest objection. If the circumstances were slightly different you would still be responsible for your actions. In terms of responsibility, I only care if you would act differently within a set of circumstances which are only slightly different. You can not learn anything from observing numerous events all with the same exact circumstances, you only learn something about the nature of events when the circumstances are slightly different.
In the same vein, people are only responsible for actions in which they could act differently within a certain set of circumstances that are only slightly different from one another. Also whether an event is predictable under a specific set of exact circumstances gives us no information as to what or who is responsible for an action. We can only determine the responsible component under a set of numerous similar events and observing the results.
> But then you must assume that universal moral considerations indeed exist. Maybe I will make a post on that in the future as well, but if universal moral considerations don't exist, which I am inclined to suppose, then the addition of a spiritual component wouldn't add anything beneficial to the equation.
ReplyDeleteI also don’t think that there is such a thing as an objective universal morality, but then, I don’t believe that we have a soul or free will either. However, IF we want to posit free will and moral responsibility, then I think all of these are necessary components.
> It seems superfluous to assume that the purpose of the soul is to present these options to us. It also doesn't explain why simply having a soul gives us responsibility for our actions, when not having it deprives us of this responsibility.
The purpose of the soul is not to present the options, but to allow us to choose between them in a vacuum. The point, perhaps poorly presented, was that the soul is presumably choosing between right and wrong, between doing what is moral and what is selfish, without undue influence from physical factors/ prior causes.
> Here is my biggest objection. If the circumstances were slightly different you would still be responsible for your actions.
But that misses the point. If you cannot act differently than you do in a given set of circumstances, in what way are you any more responsible for your actions than the boulder?
I think focusing on one specific set of circumstances misses the point actually. I am saying you can act differently within a set of similar circumstances (similar in the sense that matters). For instance if you set up a pool shot in the same way and you try to make the same shot multiple times in succession not all of the circumstances are the same in every sense, but they are similar enough in circumstances that actually matters when trying to determine how well a pool player you are. However, if you set up a situation in which the shot with all of the circumstances being exactly the same in every way for multiple times, viewing the same determined result (lets say you make the shot) over and over again gives you no more information. You cannot determine if this person is a good pool player, or if it was just a "lucky" shot, etc.
ReplyDeleteYou can compare how a person would react under various similar enough scenarios to determine if the persons actions were due to his own decision (in which case they would be responsible) or if it were due to circumstances outside of their control (in which case they wouldn't be responsible).
The comparison to a boulder is inappropriate since humans have abilities obliges them to make appropriate choices (such as foresight, the ability to evaluate options, reasoning, etc) which a boulder does not have. The boulder has no ability to avoid anything, whereas people do have this ability. Using a similar example as above, if a large rock is flying towards a boulder, under multiple similar (but not exactly the same) scenarios the boulder will in every scenario be hit and roll down the hill. The boulder thus has no ability to avoid the rock and its state of rolling down the hill can be said to be inevitable.
Humans on the other hand have the ability to avoid large rocks. If a large rock is flying towards a human, under multiple similar (but not exactly the same) scenarios the human will sometimes be hit and roll down the hill and other times not. The human thus has the ability to avoid the rock and its state of rolling down the hill can be said to be evitable. He is free in this sense where the boulder is not.
As I said earlier you can define free will to be in contradiction with determinism (such as free will is the ability to chose different options under the exact same circumstances (exactly the same in every way)), but such definitions don't improve our notions of responsibility and are ultimately pointless definitions, especially since they don't likely exist in the real world except in an illusion.
> The boulder has no ability to avoid anything, whereas people do have this ability.
ReplyDeleteAh, but that is my whole point. People do NOT have this ability. We just like to think that we do. The factors that determine our actions are far more complex than those that determine the boulder’s, but the actions of both ourselves and the boulder are equally inevitable.
> Humans on the other hand have the ability to avoid large rocks.
But so what? That we have more abilities than a boulder that allow for a greater range of outcomes doesn’t make those outcomes any less inevitable. The circumstances still dictate the outcome.
> you can define free will…
Perhaps that is the problem here. Free will is typically understood to mean the ability to choose freely, that is, without one’s choice being wholly determined by circumstance. You seem to be using a different definition. If I understand you correctly, you are proposing that free will is the possibility to do different things in similar but not identical situations. But how is that free will? By that definition, the boulder has free will because when rolling down the same hill, it will sometimes go left and sometimes go right depending on the exact direction of a gentle breeze, or the amount of water in a patch of mud, or the exact position of a fallen leaf. I don’t see why if the difference is the stimulation of neuron A or neuron B by visual inputs or the existence or not of a particular memory we should call that “free will.”
> but such definitions don't improve our notions of responsibility
ReplyDeleteWhat has that got to with whether free will is a real thing?
> and are ultimately pointless definitions,
As a definition it’s not pointless. It lets us be sure we talking about the same thing.
> especially since they don't likely exist in the real world except in an illusion.
Yes. So? Neither do leprechauns, but we could talk about those, too. Free will probably isn’t a real thing. Why try to save the concept by redefining it? That’s like trying to say that there really are leprechauns, but they’re really a type of small monkey that likes to hoard shiny objects and rolls in moss so that its coat turns green. You could call the monkeys “leprechauns,” but they wouldn’t be what was traditionally meant by the term.
Being able to do different things in similar but not identical situations is only a part of it. The other part is the ability to evaluate options, foresee outcomes of actions taken, and the ability to reason. Essentially it is these abilities that I define as necessary to have free will and it works in deterministic and indeterministic universes. Since rocks don't have these abilites, they can't be said to have free will. In addition they don't have the power to avoid things, the power to reproduce, etc. There are many things rocks can't do that humans can.
ReplyDeleteFor example people and many other animals have the power to avoid things. Some are better avoiders than others. Rocks are very poor avoiders, many animals are very good avoiders. You can be a good avoider even in a deterministic world.
For free will, as I define it above, humans have these qualities to a much greater degree than other animals. Some people are in this sense more free than others, even in a deterministic world. Free will as you conceive of it is in my opinion a useless definition. Just as we can judge some animals as being better avoiders than others (in a deterministic world) so to we can judge peoples actions as either being morally sound (depending on how you define morality), reasonable, fair, etc. That is what I mean by free will, that people have certain abilities, primarily intellectual abilities which we can judge as either being effective/proper or ineffective/improper.
Btw when I say that definition of free will is pointless/useless/etc that is not meant to be an insult to you in any way. I really appreciate all of your thoughts on this subject as it sharpens my own beliefs on it.
ReplyDeleteI only say it since I think defining free will in such a way doesn't help us in attributing judging whether actions are proper or not. It also doesn't add any meaning to a persons life, imo.
The way I see this is because if we set up a situation where everything is exactly the same, the situation is the same, the place, the time, the health of the individual and even the individuals thoughts and see what he ends up doing (ie the results of the experiment) and the results are different every time, it doesn't seem to me to help give this person any more responsibility for his actions than he already has in a completely deterministic universe. For instance if a person plays the same exact pool game over an over and a particular shot in an indetermenistic world is different in each scenario then, you can't say the difference has anything to do with the person themselves. They are doing the exact same thing, they are having the exact same thoughts and feel the exact same way every time. The changing results then don't add any competency to the person performing the action at all. All it does is add a random component in the end which isn't determined by anything prior to it and thus doesn't give any responsiblity (in terms of praise or criticism) to the person performing the action any more than it would for the ball or the pool stick themselves.
I think the same general principals apply for situations in which the individual makes a decision in a moral dilemma.
I do indeed think that the persons competence or moral reasoning can be judged in either scenario, I just think that adding an element that isn't determined by anything at all into the equation, doesn't improve our ability to make such judgements at all.
It all comes down to the animal soul. Yes we are animals who have a tendency to act from instinct, yet Hashem has given us a soul as well. As I have said in past writing that Elohim use both good and evil to accomplish his task here on earth. G-d himself could be called the creator of both good and evil since this is the paradox that man wrestles with from the cradle to the grave. I believe animals possess free will as well, like us they sometimes act out of instinct, and sometime they actual do exercise free will in their daily lives. What interesting to think about that in all of creation man was LAST. Even after animals. If you think about our importance from this perspective relevant to the order of creation maybe we are not as dear to G-d as we choose to believe. If you look at mans impact on Hashem's creation, compared to that of animals, i think you will find that animals have honored G-d better than man. In fact, it could be argued that they are more divine than man if you consider divine will. So, maybe we should accept that we are animals with the ability to do acts of goodness and evil, but as a whole humanity is a pretty sorry lot when compared to animals, and nature. I feel Hashem loved the animals so much that he had Noach save all of them, but wiped out all of humanity except for Noach and his wife, and his 3 sons Ham, Shem, and Japeth and their wives respectfully. Ham,we all know where that nation is today(Africa), and it present state of disfunction in G-ds' eyes. Shem, well if DNA don't lie,(which it doesn't), it is the people now calling themselves Palestinians(who are descendants of Abraham) that are attempting to destroy Israel. An Japeth is the father to the Gentiles....... Humans have been a mixed bag of tricks from their inception, yet animals in all their simplicity are probably closer to the Divine Will by Nature. My conclusion is that we could all learn a lot from animals, and maybe we should relax, and quit over thinking things, and live more simply in love and harmony like the animals do. After all they only kill when they are hungry, and they live in total harmony with all that is around them, and they do not harm the earth. Shalom Aleichem
ReplyDelete